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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the determinants of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing 
by focusing on variables relating to information asymmetry, investor sentiment, and 
corporate governance and examines whether the determinants of IPO underpricing in 
high-technology and non-high-technology IPOs differ. With the data from Taiwan from 
2009 - 2011, this study finds that overallotment is negatively related to underpricing, 
whereas market momentum, first day trading volume, and managers’ ownership 
retention rates are positively related to underpricing, particularly for high-technology 
IPOs. Our results support the signaling hypothesis in high-technology IPOs.  
 
JEL classification: G12; G14; G24; G32 
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1. Introduction 
The liberalization of financial markets has directed management attention to using 
capital markets to raise equity finance for business. Companies increasingly go public 
through initial public offerings (IPOs) to obtain new sources of finance. Previous 
studies have reported the existence of IPO underpricing and revealed that stock prices 
continually increase from the offering date until the listing date (Reilly, 1973; Ibbotson, 
1975; Engelen and van Essen, 2010; Khurshed et al., 2014).  
IPO underpricing is not limited to the United States and Europe (Yong, 2007; 
Engelen and van Essen, 2010); it has also been observed in Asian emerging economies 
(Loughran et al., 1994; Lin and Chuang, 2011; Khurshed et al., 2014). For example, 
Loughran et al. (1994) find that the average IPO initial return is 17.6% in Hong Kong, 
78.1% in South Korea, 80.3% in Malaysia, 45.0% in Taiwan, and 58.1% in Thailand. 
Engelen and van Essen (2010) observe that the average IPO initial return is 30%–47% 
in Taiwan and 127%–950% in China. Although previous studies confirm IPO 
underpricing in Asian emerging markets, such studies are inadequate compared with 
those conducted in the United States and Europe (Yong, 2007). Indeed, the institutional 
characteristics and practices of IPOs in Asian emerging economies are unique and 
considerably different from those of U.S. and European markets (Chan et al., 2011; 
Chen et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2014). There is a need to identify the determinants of 
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IPO underpricing in Asian emerging markets.  
Moreover, past studies have paid little attention to the differences of IPO 
underpricing between high-technology (high-tech) and non-high-technology (non-tech) 
sectors in emerging markets, though the literature has demonstrated differences 
between high-tech and non-tech IPOs in motivation, issuing strategy, and long-term 
performance (Carpenter et al., 2003; Kim and Pukthuanthong-Le, 2008). Because 
high-tech firms tend to have more volatile operating cash flows than do non-tech firms, 
they often face difficulties in meeting interest and principal repayment obligations 
should they choose debt financing. IPOs are therefore attractive means for high-tech 
firms to raise finance. Furthermore, high-tech firms typically have few tangible assets, 
but they possess substantial intangible assets in the form of patents and other 
intellectual property; such asset structures result in considerably high financial distress 
if high-tech firms use debt financing. In addition, high-tech firms that have little or no 
profitability in their early operating years tend to benefit little from debt tax shields 
(e.g., from tax savings associated with the tax deductibility of interest payments). 
These characteristics of high-tech firms are often ignored in prior studies on IPO 
underpricing, as all IPOs are usually ‘thrown into one basket’. Clearly, an investigation 
of the differences of determinants between high-tech and non-tech IPO underpricing 
would provide potential contributions to the existing knowledge of IPOs and IPO 
underpricing.  
Therefore, this study attempts to determine whether the determinants of IPO 
underpricing in high-tech and non-tech IPOs differ with the data from Taiwan, an 
emerging economy in Asia. In Taiwan, IPOs from high-tech sectors constitute a high 
proportion of public offerings. This study investigates the determinants of IPO 
underpricing by distinguishing between high-tech and non-tech sectors and testing 
three groups of variables, namely information asymmetry, investor sentiment, and 
corporate governance. First, we use issue size (MKT), underwriter reputation (REPU), 
initial price range (IPR), research and development (R&D) expenditure, overallotment 
(OA), and lot-winning rate (LWR) as proxies for information asymmetry. If less 
information asymmetry exists between underwriters and investors, the IPO 
underwriting price is generally consistent with market expectations, leading to less 
underpricing in the market. Second, we investigate first-day trading volume (VOL) and 
market momentum (MOM) as proxies for investor sentiments on the IPO underpricing 
problem. Third, we assess corporate governance factors in explaining IPO underpricing. 
We use managers’ ownership retention rate (MAN) and CEO duality (DUAL) as 
proxies for the rigorousness of a firm’s corporate governance.  
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We contribute to the literature in the following aspects. First, we find that 
information asymmetry variables such as OA and LWR are negatively related to 
underpricing, whereas investor sentiment variables such as MOM and VOL are 
positively related to underpricing. Compared with high-tech IPOs, non-tech IPOs are 
associated with a higher IPR. For high-tech IPOs, MKT, OA, and R&D reduce IPO 
underpricing. Second, we observe that there is a negative relationship between R&D 
intensity and underpricing, indicating that R&D intensity for high-tech IPOs is a signal 
of intelligent legitimacy and that technology demands reduce IPO underpricing for 
high-tech firms. Thirdly, we find there is a positive relationship between IPO 
underpricing by issuers and MAN rates, which supports our signaling hypothesis. We 
find that high-tech firm managers signal high firm value by owing shares of their firms; 
however, we do not observe a similar phenomenon for non-tech firms. Finally, we find 
that the methods of delivering of IPO information in high-tech and non-tech industries 
differ, which implies that the ‘greenshoe option’ introduced by the authorities in 
Taiwan can be used to help stabilize IPO pricing.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
institutional setting of Taiwan IPOs. Section 3 presents a literature review. Section 4 
describes the data and introduces the empirical methods. Section 5 presents and 
explains the empirical results, and Section 6 provides the conclusion. 
 
2. Institutional Setting of Taiwanese IPOs  
The institutional setting and trading practice of Taiwan’s stock market differ from 
those in developed markets. Taiwan’s stock market is principally dominated by 
individual investors, who constitute the vast majority of the trading volume (Barber et 
al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011). In 2005, the Taiwan government began introducing a new 
underwriting system to improve IPO price stability; this system includes an OA 
agreement between underwriters and an issuing company. Under this system, 
shareholders and underwriters must sign a stock purchase option (called a greenshoe 
option). In 2008, the government launched a policy to promote overseas-based 
Taiwanese companies to list on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) and created a 
funding platform to attract global high-tech companies to list on the TWSE and trade 
in over-the-counter markets. As part of this promotion, the Taiwanese government 
opened its stock market to mainland China-based companies, encouraging them to 
apply Taiwan IPOs.  
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The competitiveness of Taiwan’s capital market has increased in recent years 
because of the expanded domestic securities market and enhanced market liquidity. 
Taiwan has become an ideal location for foreign companies, particularly those in 
Greater China, to raise capital due to its attractive valuations, low listing thresholds, 
minimal currency transaction requirements, and favorable government policies. Taiwan, 
commonly regarded as a high-tech island, comprises numerous supply chains of 
high-tech industries supplying products and services such as semiconductors, 
optoelectronics, information services, computer and peripheral equipment, and 
communications and Internet services. High-tech companies constitute the highest 
proportion of industries listed on the TWSE and the Gre Tai Securities Market 
(GTSM).  
IPO underpricing, or high IPO initial return, is prevalent in the TWSE. Chang et al. 
(2014) observe that from 2006 to 2010, the average IPO underpricing in Taiwan 
increased to 50.6%. Several studies examine the factors influencing the considerably 
high IPO initial returns. Chang (2011) provides evidence that supports the social 
comparison theory in explaining Taiwan IPO underpricing.1 Chang et al. (2014) argue 
that the dual-tranche of bookbuilding in Taiwan imposes considerable regulatory 
constraints on underwriter discretion. They suggest that the high IPO underpricing in 
Taiwan may not represent increased information disclosure but rather primary market 
inefficiency, which is induced by the regulatory constraints of Taiwan’s IPO allocations 
and pricing.  
 
3. Literature Review 
This section reviews the literature on IPO underpricing to provide the context for 
this study. The numerous studies conducted on the determinants of IPO underpricing 
can be classified into three categories: (a) information asymmetry, (b) investor 
sentiments, and (c) corporate governance.  
3.1 Information asymmetry 
                                                 
1 ‘The social comparison theory in behavioral psychology suggests that when people do not know how 
to make a decision or are exposed to new information, they refer to the behavioral norm of the public or 
the behavior of others to frame their decisions. The social comparison theory was developed by 
Festinger (1954) to explain how individuals evaluate their attitudes towards an issue. The theory 
proposes that individuals prefer to evaluate self and self-characteristics according to objective standards. 
When the standards are not available, they compare themselves with society or others around them and 
look for alternative comparison standards (Chang, 2011, p.368). 
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Studies related to information asymmetry investigate information imbalance of IPO 
underpricing among underwriters, IPO firms, and investors from various perspectives 
and report diverse results (Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; 
Aboody and Lev, 2000; Hoque, 2014). Baron (1982) reports that information 
asymmetry exists between underwriters and IPO firms. When underwriters perceive 
high uncertainty in the market, they tend to issue IPO stocks at a high discount to 
reduce their risks. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) indicate that underwriters can use 
their share allocation rights to gain information from investors and reduce the level of 
underpricing. Loughran and Ritter (2002) reveal that underwriters do not always act in 
an issuer’s interest and tend to allocate shares to their favorite investors, triggering 
information asymmetry between underwriters and investors. Previous studies also 
reveal evidence of the existence of information asymmetry between issuing companies 
and investors (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Welch, 1989; Ritter and Welch, 2002). Allen 
and Faulhaber (1989) and Welch (1989) suggest that IPO underpricing acts as a signal 
of firm quality because the owners of high-quality firms have an incentive to 
underprice with the aim of subsequently selling their retained shares at a high and 
informed price. The winner’s curse hypothesis was posited in relation to this 
phenomenon, stating that underpricing arises to compensate uninformed investors for 
the adverse selection problem they face (Rock, 1986). On the basis of information 
asymmetry, Rock (1986) observes that at a low LWR, uninformed investors participate 
in IPOs; this suggests that low LWRs attract more investors to participate in IPOs. 
Thus, IPO underpricing compensates investors who withstand risk. By contrast, a high 
LWR implies low market demand, which attracts few investors to participate in IPOs; 
therefore, only informed investors participate in the draw lots. Evidence from 
numerous studies supports the Rock adverse selection hypothesis (e.g., Amihud et al., 
2003; Lin and Fok, 1997). Lin and Fok (1997) find that when investors are optimistic 
about an IPO firm’s prospects, they are more willing to purchase IPO shares, resulting 
in a lower LWR; thus, LWR is negatively related to IPO underpricing. However, 
differences exist between institutional investors and retail investors. Aggarwal et al. 
(2002) analyze the proportion of issues allocated to institutional investors and retail 
investors and discover that compared with retail investors, institutional investors 
receive a larger proportion of new issues in IPOs with a larger underpricing and gain 
more earnings, escaping ‘lemons’ in the IPO market. Examining a sample of UK IPOs 
during 1999–2006, Hoque (2014) finds that information asymmetry is a driver of IPO 
underpricing.2  
                                                 
2 This study also indicates that moral hazards drive lockups in the United Kingdom that is unique for 
UK institutional settings, which involve highly dispersed and long lockup lengths 
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Underwriter reputation (REPU) is considered a factor influencing IPO underpricing 
because it reduces IPO information asymmetry (Carter and Manaster, 1990). However, 
the empirical results of studies examining the relationships between REPU and IPO 
underpricing are inconsistent. Neuberger and La Chapelle (1983) find that low IPO 
underpricing was associated with high REPU, whereas Beatty and Welch (1996) report 
that high IPO underpricing was associated with high REPU. Su and Bangassa (2011) 
study Chinese IPOs between 2001 and 2008 and show that REPU has little influence 
on the level of IPO underpricing; however, they observe a significantly positive 
relationship between REPU and IPO long-term performance. Because of the 
inconsistent results, we examine the influence of REPU on IPO underpricing.  
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) investigate the relationship between IPR and price 
uncertainty and claim that underwriters select a wider price range to preserve the 
elasticity of the changes when they perceive greater uncertainty for the value of the 
shares of the IPO-issuing company. Hanley (1993) also argues that a wider IPR implies 
higher uncertainty, increasing the difficulty of evaluating IPO prices. 
Some studies use R&D to explain IPO underpricing. This is because R&D is a 
major source of competitive advantages for firms. For example, Guo et al. (2006) 
analyze a sample of 2,696 U.S. IPOs issued during 1980–1995 and find that R&D of 
IPO issuers significantly influences both initial IPO underpricing and the long-term 
performance of issuers. Chan et al. (1990) report that for high-tech companies, higher 
R&D expenditure is positively related to stock returns; however, they observe a 
negative relationship between R&D expenditure and stock returns for non-tech 
companies. Similar evidence is also reported by Kothari et al. (2002), who argue that 
investors expect the net value of future earnings to be enhanced when a high-tech firm 
increases its R&D expenditure. Kim and Pukthuanthong-Le (2008) find that the capital 
structure of high-tech firms is relevant to IPO underpricing. Debt that serves as a signal 
of high-tech firm quality influences IPO underpricing. For high-tech firms, higher 
leverage is associated with increased risks and uncertainty, resulting in a greater 
underpricing of their IPOs.  
Ritter and Welch (2002) argue that asymmetric information can only account for 
65% of the explanatory power of average IPO initial stock returns. Asymmetric 
information is not the primary driver of some IPO underpricing phenomena and there 
is a need to explore non-rational and agency conflict explanations of IPO underpricing. 
Following the suggestion of Ritter and Welch (2002), several studies consider investor 
behavior in determining IPO underpricing. For example, Loughran and Ritter (2002) 
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find that the managers of issuing firms appear to care less about underpricing when 
receiving favorable news regarding the increase in their personal wealth. Lowry and 
Schwert (2004) reveal that IPRs during book-building periods reflect some information 
about demand. Gao (2010) examines China’s IPO market and shows strong evidence 
supporting behavioral arguments in explaining the subsequent IPO premium.  
3.2 Investor sentiment 
Previous studies suggest that investor sentiment is related to IPO underpricing. 
Baker and Stein (2004) report that market liquidity can indicate sentiment in a world 
with short-sales constraints. An unusually liquid market is a market in which pricing is 
dominated by irrational investors, who tend to underreact to the information embodied 
in either order flow or equity matters. Thus, high liquidity indicates the positive 
sentiments of irrational investors, which lead to abnormally low expected returns. 
Lowry (2003) observes that IPO volume fluctuations can be explained by the level of 
investor optimism. When investors are overoptimistic, issuing firms should profit from 
this period and are incited to offer large IPO volumes because they are highly certain 
that the large volume of shares will be absorbed by sentimental investors (and vice 
versa). Oehler et al. (2005) document that IPO initial returns are mainly influenced by 
investor sentiment. Using grey-market prices of European IPOs as a proxy for the 
sentiments of retailer investors, Cornelli et al. (2006) observe that this sentiment 
measure can predict the first-day aftermarket prices of IPOs in favorable situations, but 
not in unfavorable situations.  
3.3 Corporate governance 
The third category of studies investigating IPO underpricing is based on corporate 
governance variables. Corporate governance, which refers to the set of internal and 
external controls and relationships implemented in an organization to address manager 
and stockholder conflicts, plays an essential role in ensuring that the interests of public 
stockholders are protected (Fama, 1980; John and Senbet, 1998). Corporate 
governance is fundamentally related to the board of directors and ownership of a firm. 
The board of directors is the central internal-control mechanism in a firm of 
monitoring managers (Fama, 1980). Firm value depends to a large extent on the quality 
of the monitoring and decision-making of the board (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In 
general, the monitoring potential of a board is measured using three factors, namely 
board size, composition, and leadership structure (Jensen, 1993). The ownership of a 
firm is likely to affect the level of agency problems and ability of stockholders to 
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control agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Ownership is mainly defined 
by two characteristics: managerial ownership and blockholder ownership.  
Previous studies examining the influence of corporate governance on IPO 
underpricing focus largely on ownership structure. The ownership dispersion 
hypothesis proposed by Brennan and Franks (1997) suggests that IPO underpricing 
results in the oversubscription of shares, which induces the issuer to restrict the 
allocation of shares. Such a dispersed ownership structure improves liquidity and 
reduces the required rate of return to achieve a higher equilibrium price in the 
secondary market (Booth and Chua, 1996). Stoughton and Zechner (1998) address the 
role of IPO underpricing and rationing in determining investor shareholdings with 
reference to agency theory and find that the value of a firm’s IPO is determined by the 
ownership structure resulting from the offering mechanism. Hartzell et al. (2008) show 
that firms with stronger governance structures measured by the percentage of shares 
held by insiders and the proportion of compensation have higher IPO valuations and 
more effective long-term operating performance compared to their peers. Chahine and 
Tohmé (2009) reveal that the negative relationship between underpricing and 
blockholding ownership is greater for foreign blockholding ownership than it is for 
domestic blockholding ownership. Analyzing the data of 525 IPOs in Taiwan, Lin and 
Chuang (2011) report that increasing family ownership and institutional ownership 
increases IPO underpricing, whereas employing independent outside directors 
mitigates IPO underpricing. 
Previous studies have also applied stewardship theory in explaining the 
determinants of corporate governance. Executives who create an organization and have 
a strong sense of attachment to and psychological ownership of the organization are 
more likely to behave as stewards. Some executives are likely to pursue organizational 
interests even when these interests conflict with their personal interests (Davis et al., 
1997; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Thus, for firms with DUAL (i.e., firms in which the 
CEO also chairs the board of directors), management has de facto control. This implies 
that the agent and principal interests are correlated, thus reducing the first-day IPO 
underpricing (Nelson, 2003). Empirical results regarding how DUAL affects IPO 
underpricing are inconsistent. For example, Hearn (2011) reveals that separating 
CEO–chairman duality and urging founders to cede CEO positions favorably 
influences IPO underpricing in West Africa. Lin and Chuang (2011) show introducing 
DUAL increase IPO underpricing in Taiwan. Using all IPOs of 12 Arab countries from 
January 2000 until June 2007, Chahine and Tohmé (2009) report an average IPO 
underpricing of 184.1% and indicate that IPO underpricing is higher in firms with 
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DUAL than in those without DUAL. They suggest that strategic shareholders (e.g., 
corporations and other industry-related investors) are likely to play a monitoring role 
and that IPO underpricing is low in firms with both DUAL and strategic shareholder 
ownership. However, Mnif (2009) finds that DUAL does not significantly affect IPO 
underpricing in France. In the current study, we attempt to provide new evidence about 
how DUAL affects IPO underpricing by separately evaluating high-tech and non-tech 
IPOs.  
4. Data Set and Research Methodology 
4.1 Sample selection 
We collect Taiwan IPO data from the TWSE and GTSM. All financial and return 
data are obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. The data 
comprises the name, industry, offer price, number of shares offered, total asset value, 
IPO price range, R&D expenditure, net sales, overallotment, LWR, market returns, 
trading volume, managerial ownership, CEO–chairman DUAL status, underwriters, 
first-date trading performance, and first-day closing price for all IPOs in the 3 years 
from January 2009 to December 2011. The focus of this study is on the determinants of 
IPO underpricing in high-tech and non-tech firms in the post-global financial crisis 
period. We exclude the IPOs of financial firms, heretofore state-owned enterprises, or 
firms with incomplete financial or return data. The number of IPOs associated with 
voting common stocks is 142. Fifty-two of the IPOs are from the TWSE and 90 are 
from the GTSM, and 94 of the IPOs are from high-tech industries and 48 are from 
non-tech industries.  
 
4.2 Variable definition 
 
We initiate the IPO pricing behavior analysis by defining the IPO firms’ initial 
returns. Following the similar procedures in Beatty and Ritter (1986), Yong (2007), and 
Gao (2010), we calculate the initial returns (IR) as follows: 
 
i i
i
i
CP OP
IR
OP


         (1)
 
where CPi is the day on which the daily closing price of firm i does not reach the daily 
limit for the first time, OPi is the offering price, and IRi is the initial return of firm i. 
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We further investigate the three categories of factors influencing IPO underpricing 
and then compare influences between high-tech IPOs and non-tech IPOs: (a) 
information asymmetry proxy, (b) investor sentiment proxy, and (c) corporate 
governance proxy.  
(a) Information asymmetry proxy 
Issue size (MKT): We measure firm size by evaluating the natural log of total assets 
(MKT) in the quarter before an IPO. Investors face difficulties in obtaining information 
about small issuing firms and evaluating their value; therefore, the IPOs of small 
issuing firms are expected to exhibit more information asymmetry problems than do 
their large counterparts. Thus, we hypothesize that MKT is negatively related to the 
IPO initial return.  
Initial price range (IPR): Hanley (1993) reports that IPOs with final offer prices 
exceeding the limits of the offer range have greater underpricing than all other IPOs. A 
wider IPR indicates higher uncertainty and information asymmetry. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that an IPR is positively associated with IPO underpricing. Following 
Hanley (1993), IPR is measured by subtracting the lower price limit from the upper 
price limit and then scaling the difference by the midrange price.  
Underwriter reputation (REPU): Because of the importance of REPU (Logue et al., 
2002; Neupane and Thapa, 2013), underwriters must quote reasonable prices to protect 
their reputation. REPU is an important indicator for investors in easing their 
asymmetric information problems (Logue et al., 2002). Neupane and Thapa (2013) 
report that underwriters with high or low reputations have strong relationships with 
various sets of investors and such relationships exert critical effects on IPO pricing. 
Low reputation underwriters demonstrate more aggressive pricing behaviors and set 
higher offer prices compared to high reputation underwriters. Carter and Manaster 
(1990) find that underwriters with higher reputation are associated with lower amounts 
of IPO underpricing. Based on the findings of these studies we hypothesize that REPU 
negatively influences IPO underpricing. Our research objective is to test whether such 
a negative relationship holds in Taiwan and whether a difference exists between 
high-tech and non-tech IPOs. We measure REPU as the ratio of the number of IPOs 
underwritten by an underwriter to the total number of IPOs in the three years preceding 
the IPO. Dunbar (1998) applies a similar measure. 
Overallotment (OA): If a share OA exists in an IPO, investors must wait to 
determine if other investors might abandon a trade; therefore, waiting investors may 
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participate in the offering. OA is typically called a greenshoe option. A greenshoe is a 
clause in an IPO underwriting agreement that enables underwriters to buy up to an 
additional 15% of issuing shares at the offering price. Underwriters participating in the 
greenshoe process can exercise this option if public demand for the shares exceeds 
expectations and the stock trades at a price exceeding its offering price. The greenshoe 
process is currently the most common method of providing aftermarket price support 
because it enables underwriters to sell more shares to the public at a limited risk than 
the actual share size offered. Thus, we hypothesize that an OA moderates IPO 
underpricing and increases aftermarket stabilization. We measure OA by calculating 
the OA at the time of the offer. 
Research and development intensity (RD): Studies indicate that information 
asymmetries are highly correlated with a firm’s R&D expenditure (Guo et al., 2006) 
and high-tech IPOs are associated with high underpricing (Kim and Pukthuanthong-Le, 
2008). Several studies observe that the pre-IPO R&D intensity of issuers is strongly 
and positively related to the first-day underpricing. This is because R&D-intensive 
issuers cannot set a high offering price for their IPOs as investors usually undervalue 
such IPOs. According to the “winner’s curse” hypothesis (Rock, 1986; Beaty and Ritter, 
1986), informed investors bid only for underpriced securities, whereas less-informed 
investors end up bidding for overpriced securities. Therefore, IPOs must be sufficiently 
underpriced to enable uninformed investors to earn a risk-adjusted return. Because of 
the characteristics of high-tech IPOs, investors are less likely to be informed about the 
potential effect of R&D activities; therefore, investors are expected to demand high 
underpricing to compensate for uncertainties. Thus, we hypothesize that RD is 
positively related to IPO underpricing. We measure RD as the ratio of R&D 
expenditure to sales in the quarter preceding a firm’s IPO. 
Lot-winning rate (LWR): LWR is directly obtained from the TEJ for the IPOs, and 
this rate is used to measure investors’ expectation and demand for IPO stocks. 
According to the winner’s curse hypothesis, in any bidding situation, uninformed 
investors overestimate the value of a specific object and tend to place higher bids than 
do their competitors. Such investors are more likely to win the bids, and thus pay a 
high price for IPO stocks. A low LWR indicates that investors have an optimal 
expectation towards an IPO firm. Consequently, when investors’ needs are not satisfied, 
demand in the secondary market increases. This increases the stock price and causes 
investors to receive abnormal first-day returns. LWR is used to measures information 
asymmetry in the new stock market and is negatively correlated with IPO initial 
returns.  
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(b) Investor sentiment proxy 
Market momentum (MOM): Loughran and Ritter (2002) report that stocks offered 
before IPOs positively influence IPO initial returns. Lyn and Zychowicz (2003) and 
Derrien and Womack (2003) find that MOM in Hungary and France exhibits a positive 
and significant effect on IPO initial returns. Therefore, we hypothesize that initial 
returns and MOM are positively correlated. We calculate MOM as follows: 
 
0
1 1
T
t
t
MOM r

 
   
 
            (2) 
where MOM is the market momentum, t = 0 is the offering day, t = T is the listing day, 
and rt is the stock index return at day t. MOM is positive when the stock index 
demonstrates an upward trend and is negative when the stock index demonstrates a 
downward trend. 
First-day trading volume (VOL): The trading volume is measured by dividing the 
VOL by the total outstanding shares. The trading volume is an important indicator of 
the behavior of individual investors (Gao, 2010). Cornelli et al. (2006) reveal that the 
IPO trading volume is positively related to the behavior of individual investors and 
leads to high first-day IPO returns. Therefore, we hypothesize that initial returns and 
VOL are positively correlated. 
(c) Corporate governance proxy 
Managers’ ownership retention rate (MAN): According to agency theory, managers 
with high ownership retention have modest incentives to undertake non-value 
maximizing projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Because of the reduction of agency 
costs, agency theory predicts that firm value increases with management ownership. 
Both Beatty and Zajac (1994) and Mikkelson and Partch (1997) suggest that executives 
and outside shareholders have a higher conflict of interest when executives’ stakes 
decrease, which diminishes performance. By contrast, when executives retain equity, 
they signal to outside investors that their firms have high value. Leland and Pyle (1977) 
observe that a manager owning shares in a company is unintentionally signaling that 
the firm has a high value (signaling hypothesis). Share retention serves as a signal of 
firm optimal quality because founders know more about their firms’ future cash flows. 
Morck et al. (1988) examine how the bonding of management affects agency costs by 
retaining an ownership stake of an IPO firm. They determine that retained ownership 
increases the IPO firm value because it provides a guarantee that managers can 
14 
internalize the value effects of their decisions about firms through retained ownership, 
and thus will make decisions in the interests of the firms rather than for their own 
benefit. Because of reductions in agency costs, the price investors are willing to pay for 
IPO shares is expected to increase. Retained ownership is a positive indicator of IPO 
firm value. Thus, we hypothesize that MAN and the initial underpricing are positively 
correlated. We measure the MAN as managerial ownership shares scaled by the total 
number of outstanding shares.  
CEO duality (DUAL): The results of previous studies on the effects of DUAL on a 
firm’s performance are inconsistent (e.g., Krause et al., 2014; Rechner and Dalton, 
1991). According to general perceptions of corporate leadership structures, splitting the 
titles of CEO and chairman produces superior results than does combining them. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) argue that agency costs in large organizations are reduced by 
institutional arrangements that separate decision management from decision control. 
However, several researchers argue that information costs, the costs of changing the 
succession process, and splitting titles may dilute CEO and chairman of the board 
power to provide effective leadership; therefore, combining the titles of CEO and 
chairman is indeed efficient and generally consistent with shareholders’ interests 
because management has total control (Brickley et al., 1997). Dalton et al. (1998) 
apply meta-analysis to 31 studies comprising 69 samples and observe no overall 
correlation between DUAL and firm performance. Krause and Semadeni (2014) report 
that splitting the CEO and board chairman positions leads to positive effects after weak 
firm performance, but negative effects after strong firm performance. In the current 
study, we consider DUAL as a determinant. The dummy variable is equal to 1 if an 
IPO firm has DUAL; otherwise, it is equal to zero. 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 details several characteristics of the sample data, indicating that the mean 
and median of the initial returns are 30% and 17% respectively. The average size of the 
IPO firms is NT$ 3.5 billion (approximately US$110 million). The average REPU is 
0.65% and the average IPR is 15%. The greenshoe option is approximately 11%, with 
a standard deviation of 5%. The average lot-wining rate is 4% and ranges from 0.001 
to 0.48. The R&D intensity ranges from 1% to 240%. The average MOM is 1% and 
ranges from −15% to 20%. The average first-day trading volume is 5% with a range 
from 1% to 18%.  
<Insert Table 1 Here> 
15 
 Table 2 shows the correlations among the information asymmetry, investor 
sentiment, and corporate governance measures. Initial return (IR) demonstrates 
positive and significant correlations with MOM and VOL, and negative and significant 
correlations with MKT, LWR and DUAL. In general, the correlations between the 
information asymmetry, investor sentiment, and corporate governance variables are 
small and insignificant. Only 12 of the correlations reach a significance level of at least 
10%.  
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics for the high-tech industry, RD expenditure, MAN, and DUAL 
 Panel A of Table 3 shows the full sample and subsample descriptive statistics for 
the high-tech industry, RD expenditure, MAN, and DUAL. Panel B shows the statistics 
for the double classification between the high-tech industry, MAN, and DUAL. Panel 
A reveals that the initial return for the entire sample is 30.26%, indicating that 
Taiwan’s IPOs are underpriced. In addition, the average underpricing level of the 
high-tech IPOs is 31.7%, which is higher than that of the non-tech IPOs, implying that 
the high-tech IPOs have greater information asymmetry. The results also reveal that the 
initial return for IPOs of firms without DUAL is 32.98%, which is higher than the 
stock of IPOs of firms with DUAL (i.e., 12.64%); this finding is consistent with that of 
Brickley et al. (1997). Moreover, a positive MOM is observed before IPO filing, 
implying that firms tend to go public during bull markets. The average log market size 
is 14.36, and the difference in the log market size between the high-intensity R&D and 
low-intensity R&D IPOs is −0.589, indicating that high-intensity R&D IPOs tend to be 
associated with smaller firms compared with low-intensity R&D IPOs. We also find 
that the high-intensity R&D IPOs have less uncertainty than do the low-intensity R&D 
IPOs. In addition, the stocks of the high-intensity R&D IPOs tend to have higher 
momentum and trading volume compared with those of the low-intensity R&D IPOs.  
 Panel B indicates that DUAL and high-tech IPOs are less underpriced than the 
non-DUAL, high-tech IPOs (16.6% vs. 33.9%); the mean difference between these two 
groups is −17.2% (t = −2.32), implying that DUAL reduces the uncertainty of 
high-tech IPOs and thus reduces their underpricing. DUAL exerts a stronger influence 
on non-tech IPOs compared with high-tech IPOs, and the difference in underpricing for 
non-tech IPO between with DUAL and those without DUAL is −25.3% (t = −2.91). 
Therefore, when the chairman of a board of directors also acts as CEO, management 
16 
has total control; consequently, firms with DUAL tend to quote offering prices close to 
the first-day closing price. However, the stocks of IPOs without DUAL have higher 
underpricing. This implies that adopting effective corporate governance practices is an 
indicator of positive firm value. Moreover, the stocks of high-tech IPOs generate 
31.72% returns (t = 6.31), whereas those of non-tech IPOs generate 27.40% returns (t 
= 4.17). This signifies that high-tech IPOs exhibit higher growth potential compared 
with non-tech IPOs. We double-sort stocks according to high-tech or non-tech status 
and MAN (Table 3) and observe that high-tech IPO stocks with high MAN produce 
higher first-day returns (32.3%) compared with the other three groups. As expected, 
non-tech IPOs with low MAN produce the lowest first-day return (2.26%). We also 
conduct multivariate analyses to examine the effects of interactions among technology, 
R&D spending, MAN, and DUAL on IPO underpricing. 
<Insert Table 3 Here> 
 
5.2. Initial return determinants 
Regression (3) is used to examine the information asymmetry control variables 
related to IPO underpricing, including MKT, REPU, IPR, RD, OA, and LWR.  
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     (3) 
Column 1 of Table 4 shows that OA is negatively related to IPO underpricing (t = 
−2.05), signifying that OA enhances aftermarket stabilization. LWR is negatively 
related to IPO underpricing (t = −2.12), supporting the winner’s curse hypothesis.  
Regression (4) shows the independent and moderating variables of investor 
sentiment, including MOM and first day trading volume ratio.  
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Column 2 of Table 4 reveals that both MOM and VOL are positively related to IPO 
underpricing (t = 4.32 and t = 6.77 respectively), indicating that market conditions and 
market liquidity are partly reflected by IPO pricing. 
Regression (5) shows the independent and moderating variables of corporate 
governance, including MAN, DUAL, and a high-tech industry dummy (TECH). 
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Column 3 of Table 4 reveals that MAN is positively related to IPO underpricing (t 
= 2.14). This result is consistent with the signaling hypothesis (i.e., a manager owning 
shares in a company is unintentionally signaling that the firm has a high value, leading 
to higher initial returns). DUAL is negatively related to IPO underpricing (t = −1.65), 
signifying that combining the CEO and chairman positions reduces the uncertainty of 
high-tech firms in pricing their IPOs, thereby reducing underpricing. Column 3 also 
shows that TECH and IPO underpricing are positively related, though the relationship 
is insignificant. 
We combine regression (6) with a MAN rate and high-tech IPO (MAN × TECH) 
interaction term to determine whether ownership retention increases the value of IPO 
firms. Column 4 of Table 4 reveals that the interaction term (MAN × TECH) is 
significantly positive (t = 1.73), indicating that IPO underpricing is greater at higher 
levels of MAN rate for the high-tech industry. Regression (6) includes two additional 
interaction terms, namely DUAL and high-tech IPO (DUAL × TECH) and R&D 
expenditure and high-tech IPO (TECH × RD). The interaction term (DUAL × TECH) 
and DUAL (DUAL) are insignificant (t = 0.44 for both terms), indicating that DUAL 
does not directly moderate the form of the relationship between technology and IPO 
underpricing. The interaction term (TECH × RD) is significantly negative (t = −1.77), 
signifying that R&D expenditure can reduce the influence of uncertainty on IPO 
underpricing because of the high demand for technology.  
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< Insert Table 4 Here> 
The results in Column 4 of Table 4 suggest that technology does not directly 
influence IPO underpricing. Thus, we further investigate whether technology indirectly 
moderates IPO underpricing. Column 1 of Table 5 shows that for high-tech IPOs, RD 
and MAN are significant (t = −2.29 and 2.15, respectively), while for non-tech IPOs, 
RD and MAN are insignificant (t = 0.14 and 0.48 respectively). Our results suggest 
that investor perceptions about firm value significantly influence underpricing 
phenomena across various industries. For non-tech IPOs, we observe that the IPR 
positively and significantly influence IPO underpricing, and LWRs negatively affect 
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IPO underpricing. The results are consistent with our expectations. Typically market 
news about high-tech IPOs attracts investors’ attention more easily compared with that 
about non-tech IPOs. Therefore, the methods of delivering IPO information in 
high-tech and non-tech industries differ. We find that non-tech IPOs are associated 
with a higher IPR, implying high market price uncertainties leading to considerable 
underpricing effect for the first trading day. One reason for this may be that in Taiwan’s 
stock market, less timely and high-quality market-ready information is available for 
non-tech firms compared with high-tech firms; thus, investors may have difficulty in 
interpreting the IPO pricing information of such firms in the pre-IPO market. For 
high-tech IPOs, the MKT and OA reduce IPO underpricing. These results are 
consistent with those of previous studies. Notably, we observe a negative relationship 
exists between R&D intensity and underpricing in the case of high-tech IPOs. This 
result is different from the findings of some prior studies that show investors typically 
undervalue R&D-intensive firms. However, underpricing is extremely costly for 
issuers because it reduces a firm’s capital. RD is considerably vital for high-tech 
industries as it enables them to develop technologies and establish a strong intellectual 
property portfolio. Evidence shows that R&D intensity for high-tech IPOs is a signal of 
intelligent legitimacy and that technology demand reduces IPO underpricing for 
high-tech firms. Moreover, we find that the MAN rate is positively related to first-day 
trading returns for high-tech IPOs. This result is consistent with the signaling 
hypothesis and supports the argument that the ownership retention rate is a signal of a 
company’s quality. However, this relationship does not reach significance for non-tech 
IPOs. This may be because more high-tech firms in Taiwan adopt executive share 
bonus schemes compared with non-tech firms. Furthermore, the Chow test 
demonstrates that a significant difference exists in the explanatory power of the 
regressions between the two subsamples (F-value = 12.14) as shown in Table 5. 
< Insert Table 5 Here> 
 
6. Conclusions 
 In this study, we investigate the first-day underpricing of IPOs in Taiwan during 
the post-financial crisis period of 2009–2011. We examine 142 IPOs in Taiwan, and the 
results show substantial IPO underpricing of approximately 30.26%. We hypothesize 
that three categories of factors influence IPO underpricing, namely information 
asymmetry, investor sentiment, and corporate governance. Our results support the 
existence of all three categories determining IPO underpricing. In particular, we find 
that information asymmetry variables such as OA and LWR are negatively related to 
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underpricing, whereas investor sentiment variables such as MOM and first-day trading 
volume are positively related to underpricing.  
We divide IPO stocks into high-tech IPOs and non-tech IPOs. We find that for 
high-tech IPOs MKT, OA, and RD are negatively related to underpricing. The MKT, 
OA, and RD reduce high-tech IPO underpricing, whereas high MAN rates increase 
high-tech IPOs’ first-day trading returns. This result is consistent with the signaling 
hypothesis and supports the argument that ownership retention rate is a signal of a 
company’s quality. For non-tech IPOs the IPR positively and significantly affects IPO 
underpricing, and LWRs and DUAL negatively affect IPO underpricing. Overall, the 
findings of this study suggest that IPO prices can be stabilized by introducing 
greenshoe options, and IPO underpricing is strong in hot markets, particularly when 
investor demand is high. Furthermore, our results show that high manager ownership 
retention rates in high-tech IPOs are associated with high IPO underpricing, which 
supports the signaling hypothesis. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Variables      Percentiles 
 Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 25 50 75 
IR 0.30 0.17 0.48 -0.20 3.49 0.00 0.17 0.41 
MKT (millions) 3,553 1,410 11,181 209 130,495 892 1,410 3,137 
REPU 0.065 0.066 0.047 0.00 0.19 0.024 0.0662 0.0960 
IRP 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.00 1.02 0.10 0.13 0.18 
OA 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.15 
LWR 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.48 0.01 0.02 0.05 
RD 0.19 0.13 0.25 0.01 2.40 0.08 0.13 0.23 
MOM 0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.15 0.20 -0.05 0.02 0.05 
VOL 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.05 0.06 
MAN 0.36 0.31 0.19 0.01 0.94 0.21 0.31 0.45 
DUAL 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 2 Correlation analysis 
 IR MKT REPU IRP OA LWR MOM VOL MAN DUAL TECH 
MKT -0.23***           
REPU 0.04 0.05          
IRP 0.08 -0.16** -0.08         
OA -0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02        
LWR -0.28*** 0.43*** -0.16* 0.08 -0.12       
MOM 0.42*** 0.01 0.15* 0.001 0.12 -0.26***      
VOL 0.60*** -0.26*** 0.07 -0.004 -0.07 -0.34*** 0.27***     
MAN 0.10 -0.09 0.11 -0.01 -0.02 0.006 -0.02 -0.002    
DUAL -0.14* -0.02 -0.11 0.01 0.005 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.04**   
TECH 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.003 0.003 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.20 -0.02  
RD -0.08 -0.22** 0.05 0.01 -0.18* -0.05 -0.12 0.00 -0.05 0.02 -0.16* 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics by high-tech industry, RD expenditure, ownership retention by managers, and CEO duality 
Panel A 
 Full 
 
(1) 
TECH 
 
(2) 
Non- 
TECH 
(3) 
High 
R&D 
(4) 
Low 
R&D 
(5) 
High 
MAN 
(6) 
Low 
MAN 
(7) 
Dual 
 
(8) 
Non 
Dual 
(9) 
 
 
(2)-(3) 
 
 
t-stat 
 
 
(4)-(5) 
 
 
t-stat 
 
 
(6)-(7) 
 
 
t-stat 
 
 
(8)-(9) 
 
 
t-stat 
IR 0.302 0.317 0.274 0.287 0.317 0.330 0.274 0.126 0.329 0.043 (0.52) -0.030 (-0.37) 0.056 (0.70) -0.203 (-3.53) 
MKT 14.366 14.408 14.283 2.558 3.148 14.212 14.519 14.306 14.375 0.124 (0.68) -0.589 (-3.76) -0.307 (-1.89) -0.068 (-0.28) 
REPU 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.065 0.068 0.060 0.051 0.066 -0.001 (-0.15) -0.001 (-0.17) 0.008 (1.00) -0.015 (-1.36) 
IRP 0.154 0.155 0.154 0.169 0.140 0.165 0.144 0.158 0.154 0.0003 (0.03) 0.029 (1.63) 0.021 (1.20) 0.004 (0.25) 
OA 0.106 0.106 0.105 0.103 0.109 0.105 0.107 0.107 0.106 0.001 (0.03) -0.006 (-0.70) -0.002 (-0.22) 0.001 (0.05) 
LWR 0.040 0.044 0.030 0.029 0.050 0.037 0.042 0.033 0.041 0.013 (1.60) -0.020 (-1.92) -0.005 (-0.54) -0.007 (-0.77) 
MOM 0.009  0.011  0.004  0.009  0.008  0.008  0.010  0.011  0.008  0.007 (0.59) 0.001 (0.14) -0.002 (-0.17) 0.003 (0.20) 
VOL 0.052  0.053  0.049  0.056  0.048  0.053  0.051  0.046  0.053  0.004 (0.89) 0.007 (1.54) 0.002 (0.35) -0.006 (-1.27) 
MAN 0.030  0.035  0.019  0.030  0.030  0.053  0.007  0.034  0.029  0.016 (3.02) -0.000 (-0.02) 0.046 (9.80) 0.005 (0.61) 
DUAL 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.10 - - -0.02 (-0.29) -0.01 (-0.24) 0.07 (1.23) -  
TECH 0.662 - - 0.619 0.704 0.746 0.577 0.631 0.666 -  -0.084 (-1.06) 0.169 (2.14) -0.035 (-0.28) 
RD 0.195 0.211 0.155 0.308 0.080 0.175 0.213 0.208 0.192 0.055 (1.71) 0.227 (6.01) -0.038 (-0.90) 0.015 (0.25) 
N 142 94 48 71 71 71 71 19 123         
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Panel B 
 High- 
MAN/ 
TECH 
 
(1) 
Low- 
MAN/ 
TECH 
 
(2) 
High- 
MAN/ 
Non- 
TECH 
(3) 
Low- 
MAN/ 
Non- 
TECH 
(4) 
Dual/ 
TECH 
 
 
(5) 
Non- 
Dual/ 
TECH 
 
(6) 
Dual / 
Non- 
TECH 
 
(7) 
Non- 
Dual/ 
Non- 
TECH 
(8) 
 
 
 
(1)-(2) 
 
 
 
t-stat 
 
 
 
(3)-(4) 
 
 
 
t-stat 
 
 
 
(5)-(6) 
 
 
 
t-stat 
 
 
 
(7)-(8) 
 
 
 
t-stat 
IR 0.323 0.309 0.353 0.226 0.166 0.339 0.057 0.311 0.013 (0.13) 0.126 (0.93) -0.172 (-2.32) -0.253 (-2.91) 
MKT 14.245 14.618 14.113 14.385 14.328 14.419 14.269 14.286 -0.372 (-1.99) -0.272 (-0.92) -0.091 (-0.31) -0.016 (-0.04) 
REPU 0.067 0.060 0.073 0.060 0.040 0.067 0.069 0.065 0.006 (0.62) 0.013 (0.90) -0.027 (-2.15) 0.004 (0.20) 
IRP 0.170 0.135 0.152 0.155 0.158 0.154 0.159 0.153 0.034 (1.59) -0.002 (-0.10) 0.003 (0.15) 0.006 (0.21) 
OA 0.107  0.105  0.099  0.109  0.104  0.106  0.111  0.105  0.002 (0.15) -0.010 (-0.63) -0.002 (-0.14) 0.006 (0.31) 
LWR 0.041 0.048 0.024 0.034 0.040 0.045 0.021 0.032 -0.007 (-0.48) -0.010 (-1.35) -0.004 (-0.21) -0.010 (-1.52) 
MOM 0.006  0.018  0.013  -0.002  0.010  0.011  0.013  0.002  -0.012 (-0.89) 0.015 (0.71) -0.002 (-0.10) 0.011 (0.43) 
VOL 0.053  0.055  0.054  0.046  0.050  0.054  0.041  0.051  -0.002 (-0.33) 0.007 (0.99) -0.004 (-0.57) -0.010 (-1.81) 
MAN 0.056  0.008  0.042  0.006  0.044  0.034  0.017  0.020  0.049 (8.14) 0.036 (7.60) 0.010 (0.87) -0.002 (-0.30) 
DUAL 0.19 0.05 0.11 0.17 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.00 0.14 (2.18) -0.05 (-0.51) - - - - 
TECH 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - - - - - 
RD 0.184 0.242 0.148 0.160 0.240 0.206 0.139 0.158 -0.058 (-0.99) -0.012 (0.44) 0.034 (0.38) -0.019 (-0.49) 
N 53 41 18 30 12 82 7 41         
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Table 4 Results of the moderated regression analyses between the independent variables and underpricing 
Variables 
    
Intercept 1.7415*** 
(2.54) 
0.8705 
(1.51) 
0.7978 
(1.39) 
0.8585 
(1.51) 
MKT -0.0837* 
(-1.79) 
-0.0589 
(-1.56) 
-0.0610* 
(-1.64) 
-0.0667* 
(-1.78) 
REPU 0.0015 
(0.79) 
-0.0114 
(-0.73) 
-0.0066 
(-0.43) 
-0.0057 
(-0.37) 
IRP 0.3514 
(0.95) 
0.2939 
(1.01) 
0.2743 
(0.96) 
0.3120 
(1.11) 
OA -0.0152** 
(-2.05) 
-0.0109* 
(-1.83) 
-0.0124** 
(-2.11) 
-0.0127** 
(-2.19) 
LWR -0.0185*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.0005 
(-0.09) 
-0.0006 
(-0.11) 
-0.0014 
(-0.26) 
RD -0.3174** 
(-2.01) 
-0.1869 
(-1.48) 
-0.1582 
(-1.25) 
-0.0534 
(-0.38) 
MOM  0.0211*** 
(4.32) 
0.0226*** 
(4.68) 
0.0233*** 
(4.87) 
VOL  8.0659*** 
(6.77) 
0.0792*** 
(6.69) 
0.0794*** 
(6.79) 
MAN   0.0033** 
(2.14) 
0.0032** 
(2.09) 
DUAL   -0.1450* 
(-1.65) 
-0.1978 
(-1.37) 
TECH   0.0016 
(0.03) 
0.0295 
(0.32) 
MAN*TECH    0.0154* 
(1.73) 
DUAL*TECH    0.0790 
(0.44) 
TECH*RD    -0.5037* 
31 
(-1.77) 
Adj-R2 0.1088 0.4441 0.4634 0.4765 
Prob > F 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 142 142 142 142 
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Table 5 Subgroup analysis for examination of the effect of MAN on DUAL 
 
High-TECH Non-TECH 
Variables 
  
Intercept 1.8043** 
(2.39) 
-0.5562 
(-0.55) 
MKT -0.1299*** 
(-2.66) 
0.0444 
(0.63) 
REPU -0.0123 
(-0.76) 
0.0047 
(0.11) 
IRP -0.0086 
(-0.03) 
0.2723** 
(2.12) 
OA -0.0117* 
(-1.71) 
-0.0130 
(-1.03) 
LWR 0.0064 
(1.09) 
-0.0638*** 
(-2.51) 
R&D -0.5841** 
(-2.29) 
0.0232 
(0.14) 
MOM 0.0241*** 
(4.06) 
0.0184** 
(2.04) 
VOL 0.0899*** 
(6.69) 
0.0555** 
(2.26) 
MAN 0.0040** 
(2.15) 
0.0014 
(0.48) 
DUAL 0.0226 
(0.14) 
-0.3826 
(-1.54) 
Adj-R2 0.5522 0.3523 
Prob > F 0.000 0.003 
N 94 48 
Difference in R2 Chow test F-value = 12.14 (p-value = 0.000) 
 
